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991.
992.
John D. Waghelstein 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(3):360-378
The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) has created a pervasive climate of fear in northern Uganda. This study addresses the purpose of this conduct. Diverging from the traditional ‘greed-grievance’ approach to the study of new wars, the LRA's behaviour is analyzed from a strategic perspective. Specifically, the article focuses on the LRA's use of mutilation, abduction, surprise, and unpredictable attacks. The conclusion is that the LRA is strategically using fear as a force multiplier, to further its organizational survival, and as a way to fight a political ‘dirty war’. 相似文献
993.
994.
Rudolph C. Barnes Jr. 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(1):1-2
In 1897 and 1898, Winston Churchill participated in what late Victorian Britain termed ‘small wars’, first on India's northwest frontier and then in the vast wasteland of the Sudan. Churchill chronicled his experiences in these conflicts in personal letters, dispatches to newspapers, and in his first two books, The Story of the Malakand Field Force and The River War. These writings provide a snapshot of a particular period in the formative years of the great statesman, demonstrating through Churchill's eloquent analyses many of the contradictions concerning the conduct of small wars that have emerged in the present era. 相似文献
995.
Thomas A. Marks 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):339-342
996.
Nathan A. Jennings 《Small Wars & Insurgencies》2013,24(2):313-334
This essay explores how federalized Texas Rangers, in the form of scout companies and larger mounted rifle regiments, provided controversial, and ultimately cost-effective, versatility to the US Army during its campaign in Northern Mexico between 1846 and 1848. It argues that their contributions centered on three tactical tasks that enhanced the invading army's maneuvers: reconnaissance, direct assault, and counterguerrilla patrolling. Each of these actions reflected a distinctive skill-set at which the auxiliaries excelled, marking them as exceptionally multifunctional assets. The Texans' augmentation coincided with, and was necessitated by, the evolving stages of the war in Northern Mexico, beginning with the American army's initial invasion, then transitioning to the assault on Monterrey, and finally ending with a troubled occupation where the rangers' brutality both enabled and undermined American pacification efforts. 相似文献
997.
998.
James S. Corum 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(4):50-77
The German invasion in Norway in April 1940 was unique in that it was the first major ‘triphibious’ campaign. It was an operation that was equally dependent upon naval, air and ground forces for success. Norway had long been of interest to German strategists, especially naval thinkers. However, no serious Wehrmacht plans for occupying Norway were even started until December 1939. A small group of staff officers of the three services put together a comprehensive plan in a matter of weeks. The article examines the effectiveness of the German interservice co‐operation and OKW leadership in a very tough and close run campaign. Although there were numerous problems, interservice co‐operation was fairly effective at the tactical and operational levels. Indeed, the Germans won the campaign largely because their services worked together much better than their Allied opponents. 相似文献
999.
Thomas G. Mahnken 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(4):26-54
An analysis of US assessments of Germany's development of armored warfare illustrates the problems that intelligence agencies face as they attempt to understand military innovation. The covert nature of German Army's tank research in the years immediately following World War I limited the number of indicators of Berlin's interest in armored warfare. Similarly, the United States possessed at best a fragmentary picture of German experimentation with armor. By the outbreak of World War II, however, US military attaches had nonetheless developed an accurate understanding of German concepts of armored warfare. If the United States is to avoid strategic surprise in the future, it must cultivate intelligence sources and employ considerably different methods from those of the Cold War. 相似文献
1000.
C. Christine Fair 《战略研究杂志》2013,36(2):201-227
Throughout the 1990s Pakistan sought to cultivate ‘strategic depth’ throughout Iran, Afghanistan and the newly emergent Central Asian Republics while seeking to restrict Indian influence in the region. Chastened by its past failures, Pakistan now embraces more modest regional goals. Despite the diminution in objectives, several factors augur failure including Pakistan's policies in Afghanistan, which diminish the likelihood of a stable Afghanistan, and Pakistan's inability to pacify the various insurgencies roiling both Baluchistan and the Pashtun areas of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas as well as the Northwest Frontier Province. 相似文献